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BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the police officer properly stopped the 
Defendants for the violation of following too closely and whether 
the stop can be justified under both the Federal and State 
Constitutions? 
II. Whether the amount of time that the officer detained 
the Defendants coupled with the degree of aggressiveness and 
coerciveness exhibited by the officer towards the Defendants 
amounted to a de facto arrest? 
III. Whether the officer had a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion sufficient to justify A) a pat-down search for weapons 
of the passenger pursuant to Terry v. Ohio and Section 77-7-16, 
Utah Code; and B) could the officer lawfully use the keys found in 
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I lit |iiassenqpi",!i pocket purwiMiil" I'M tin-1 fiat down s e a r c h for weapons 
Lu f u r t h e r s e a r c h In Llie U u n k ol t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e ; " 
IV Whether the Defendants gave a valid consent to 
seai ' i In id I In nil it*ir ilia iiiiiiiiiiill I i iiiiiil i oiitpai t.nneiil , ill ulm. I i: i i 
wlhif.'-i iif*!« t h e r e was p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o s e a r c h t h e D e f e n d a n t v e h i c l e 
based on t h e r i l l e q e d n e r v o u s b e h a v i o r of t h e d r i v e r , t h e f a c t t h a t 
b o t h lie and t h e p a s s e n g e r wore s u n g l a s s e s , .iinid Mi i1 l.m.i HI 
i n t e r i o r of t h e i r v e h i c l e was c] u t t e r e d ? 
DETERMINM! I Il IE CONSTITUTX 2 1! IE! I PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 
CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES 
F o u r t h Amendment 
mi I in mi" i mi H.JI I I I 1 1 1 I I in iii" ( a ! ( » | j 1 1 " I I in 1 1 i • 11 , ; t , mi in i i . " mi mi mi I I in mi mi mi i p e f L 1 1 1 . i „ 1 1 1 "i 1 1 s e s , 
papers, and effects -iqainst unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall 1 not be violated, .in \\ in warrants shall issue, Din upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or al ILirmation, »:ind particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be =;e:i zed „ , . 
CONSTITUTION OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
Article I, Secti on 1 4 
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place to be searched, and the person or th i eg to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged on June 22, 1988, by criminal 
information, with 1) Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute, a Second (2nd) Degree Felony, a violation of 
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended); 
2) Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 58-37a-5(l), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended); 3) Obstruction of Justice, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 76-8-3 06, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended); 4) Open Container in Motor Vehicle, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 44-6-44.20, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended); and 5) Interference with a Peace Officer, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, a violation of Section 76-8-305, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Defendants moved the District Court for the Fourth 
Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding, to suppress all evidence seized 
from the Defendants or from their automobile by officers of the 
Utah Highway Patrol. A hearing was held on the motion on December 
9, 1988. The Court held that the officer made a proper stop and 
had sufficient reason to make a pat down search of Defendant 
Southern, which resulted in the officer finding a set of keys in 
Mr. Southern's pocket. The Court further stated that it was of the 
opinion that the keys were then taken by Defendant Lovegren, who 
opened the trunk, removed the suitcase and opened it so that the 
officer could look inside it. The Court inferred that there was 
3 
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un J u n e 1 '1, UOii , <\ppelLant , Lovegren i b i i v e i i was 
o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e un li S, I n t e r s t a t e 15 in t h e a r e a nt 
'i |iHiiish Km I III ill lli< iMi in ( (Jiiipiiiii i PI I In, mi i iiisst'iiqpi \|I(H I 
S o u t h e r n (PassengtM m I'he c a r b e l o n g e d t o I lie D r i v e r ' s b r o t . t ! 
( T r a n s c r i p t S u p p r e s s i o n Ho . innq ( R , | p p . U, b i ) . l h e a u t o m o b i l e 
i l l i f 1 111 M i II ill 111 II i i l l ) II 111 111 1 i j l l W . i l , II II I II 
A southbound Utah Highway Patrol oopet observe3 :he car 
the,;
 s *• elts />r- i f \. » *'tici was sot sufficicr* 
i t s p II I II 11 i Il I in i l t 11 . I i i | i II II ' i I in in 
f o l l o w i n g t h e c j i 11 > i- less, t h a n one minu t e * , t o l i j w t - j iewn 
an o f f ramp, and made a t r a f f i c s t o p (P'• ft). 
'"I'lllit1 Hi IVHI injii!.,, lippiroached III' / I IHIM 
go back to the officer's car to determine wnether !e r. ;..:J 
4 
driver's license. (R. 8). It was determined that the Defendant did 
have a valid driver's license (R. 34) and that the contained a 
valid vehicle registration in the Driver's brother's name. (R. 61). 
The officer testified that each Appellant wore sun glasses which 
"made them a little suspicious as to what was going on" (R. 9). 
While talking with the officer, the Driver removed his sunglasses. 
The officer testified he noted his eyes were glassy and bloodshot 
and associated the condition of the Defendant's eyes with drug 
and/or alcohol use (R. 10). The officer also placed great emphasis 
on the fact that the Defendant was nervous about all of the 
questions that the officer was asking him (R. 10-11). 
After the initial exchange, the officer issued a warning 
citation for following too closely and escorted the Driver back to 
his car where he asked the Passenger to produce a valid driver's 
license, even though he knew that the Driver had one, and had no 
reason to believe that the Driver was not the person who he claimed 
to be (R. 11, 34). The Passenger stated that he did not have a 
valid license (R. 12). 
The officer asked the Passenger to remove his sunglasses 
so that he could look at his eyes, which he concluded looked the 
same as the Defendant's (R. 12). Though he conducted no field 
sobriety test, nor smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage, nor 
cited the Driver for driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, the officer testified he concluded that the Driver and his 
Passenger were under the influence of "something" (R. 12-13, 53-
55) . 
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Because the inside of the car was cluttered, like the men 
had been on a long trip, the officer further concluded that the 
Driver and his Passenger were possible drug runners and resolved to 
search their car (R. 34-38. See R. 28-29). The officer testified 
he asked for and received permission to search the interior of the 
vehicle so that he might look for alcoholic beverages (R. 13). 
However, the Driver and his Passenger testified that the officer at 
no time asked for permission to search the interior of the car, 
but that he told the two men to stand in front of the car and began 
to search through its interior (R. 63-64, 73). The officer did not 
have the Driver sign a consent to search form, even though one was 
probably in his patrol vehicle (R. 58), and there is no evidence 
that the officer ever told the Defendant that he had a right to 
refuse to the search of the interior of his car. 
The officer found a can of beer under the drivers seat 
that was approximately one-fourth (1/4) full (R. 13, 35-36), but 
testified he didn't know if it was still cold, or if it was warm 
when he found it (R. 36). The Defendant denied having consumed any 
alcoholic beverages (R. 12). The officer charged the Defendant 
with having an open container of an alcoholic beverage in the 
passenger compartment of the car. 
Not finding anything else, the officer asked the Driver 
and his Passenger where their luggage was. They stated they didn't 
have any (R. 14). He then allegedly asked for permission to look 
in the trunk of the car (R. 15), to which the Driver and his 
Passenger allegedly consented (R. 16). Both Appellants testified, 
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however, that the officer never asked for or received consent to 
open the trunk and to look through its contents (R. 65, 73-74). 
The officer was not able to gain immediate access to the 
trunk of the car because no key was available (R. 16). At this 
point the officer decided that he was extremely nervous and decided 
to search for "weapons" (R. 17)• The Driver, who was wearing a 
mesh shirt and a pair of sweat pants, was not patted down (R. 18, 
39-40). The Passenger, who was wearing a tight pair of jeans and 
no shirt at all, was patted down (R. 41, 64). During the pat-down 
of the Passenger, the officer felt a small hard object with "some 
length to it" inside of the Passenger's pocket (R. 41). The 
officer reached into the pocket, without asking the Passenger what 
it was, and pulled it from the pocket (R. 18, 44). The object was 
recognized as possibly part of a key ring connector which may have 
matched a key ring connector seen on the ignition key (R. 18, 44). 
Attached to the connector taken from the Passenger's pocket were 
car keys. The officer commented that he "bet that they fit this 
car" (R. 19). 
The officer testified the Driver indicated that they 
could now try to open the trunk with the key, and after a short 
while of saying that the key did not fit, eventually opened the 
trunk (R. 19). The Driver and the Passenger, however, each 
testified the officer himself took the key and went to the trunk 
and opened it (R. 65, R. 74). The officer, on cross examination, 
modified his recollection to indicate that once the Driver 
7 
indicated that the key did not fit, or did not work, he may have 
taken the keys from him and opened the trunk himself (R. 45). 
Once the trunk was opened, the officer looked through a 
trash bag containing dirty laundry. This was allegedly with the 
consent of the Driver (R. 22). According to the Passenger, the 
Driver only stated that there was dirty laundry in the bag (R. 66). 
The officer further testified he then asked for permission to look 
in the two suitcases which were in the trunk of the car to which 
the Driver replied that the suitcases were not his and that he had 
no idea what was in them (R. 22, 66, 77-78), but that the officer 
could look in them (R. 22), The Passenger denied such consent (R. 
67) as did the Driver (R. 75). 
The officer testified the Driver removed one suitcase 
from the trunk, put it on the ground, opened it up and revealed its 
contents (R. 22), then put a pair of levis on the top of a cookie 
box, which was visible in the case, and showed the officer the 
contents of the case, except for the cookie box (R. 23). The 
officer stated that he then reached down and grasped the end of the 
closed cookie box, squeezing the end of it so that he could see 
inside it (R.23). At the bottom of the box, beyond a row of 
cookies, the officer observed a baggie containing a white powdered 
substance (R. 23). At that point the Driver removed the box from 
the officer claiming possession of it (R. 23). He then walked to 
his car, sat in it for a moment, then exited the vehicle and threw 
the box to the Passenger, who ran off with the box and it's 
contents (R. 23-24). 
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Both Appellants testified the officer removed the 
suitcase from the trunk, put it on the ground and opened it (R. 66, 
74)• The Driver then walked over to the officer, kneeled down 
beside him, nudged him out of the way slightly, and showed the 
officer the contents of the suitcase, except for the cookie box (R. 
66, 75). The fact that clothes were placed on top of the cookie 
box in order to conceal it is not denied by the Driver (R. 76). 
Importantly, all three parties testified the officer did not ask 
for or receive permission to look in the cookie box (R. 48, 57, 67, 
76) . 
Once the Passenger had departed with the cookie box in 
his possession the Driver was arrested for possession of a 
controlled substance (R. 25). The Passenger was arrested a short 
while later in the same general area and the cookie box, with its 
contents, was found after a search of the area (Arrest Report, p. 
5). 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Under the totality of the circumstances, and taking into 
account all of the information known to the officer, and assessing 
the officer's actions against a standard of a hypothetical 
reasonable officer acting under the same situation, the officer 
made a pretextual stop, and any evidence obtained as a result of 
the pretextual stop should have been suppressed as seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
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Additionally, the provisions of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah are applicable to the facts of the case 
and this Court would not be remiss in holding that those provisions 
provide greater protection than does the comparable federal 
provision. 
POINT II 
Because of length of time that Appellants were detaining 
beyond the time reasonably necessary to issue the warning citation, 
as well as the intrusive actions of the officer who used the 
unnecessary extended period of detention as an opportunity to 
search the vehicle and the Passenger, a de facto arrest occurred 
without support of probable cause. All evidence obtained as a 
result of this arrest should have been suppressed by the trial 
court. 
POINT III 
The pat-down search of the passenger was made without 
reasonable suspicion that the passenger had or was attempting to 
commit a public offense or that he was armed or a threat to the 
officer. The keys taken from within the Passenger's pocket, not 
being a weapon or contraband or otherwise illegal were not legally 
seized or legally used by the offer in his subsequent search of the 
vehicle. Nervousness when in the presence of police, wearing 
sunglasses during the summer, having a cluttered car, or possessing 
a road map in a car are not reasonable indications that one is in 
possession of controlled substances. 
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POINT IV 
An examination of the record shows that the consent 
claimed by the officer was in fact not given. Even if the consent 
had been given, the de facto arrest without supporting probable 
cause served to coerce the consent. If a valid consent was given 
to the search of the interior and trunk of the car, it did not 
extend logically to the cookie box. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
THE STOP OF APPELLANTS VEHICLE; THE STOP WAS A PRETEXT TO 
CONDUCT A SEARCH AND WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
a
- The stop violated the protections guaranteed to 
Appellants by the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States 
In determining whether a stop for a traffic violation and 
subsequent arrest is a pretext, the totality of the circumstances 
governs. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 n.10 
(1975); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988); See 
U.S. v. Sokolow. 109 S.Ct 1581, 1585 (1989) (in evaluating validity 
of investigative stop, totality of circumstances is considered). 
This "totality of the circumstances" standard is seen in every 
stage of the inquiry in this area. In making such an assessment 
"we focus on whether a hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of 
the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, would 
have stopped [the defendants] to issue a warning . . . . The proper 
inquiry does not focus on whether the officer could validly have 
made the stop." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. "[I]f a hypothetical 
11 
reasonable police officer would not have stopped the driver for the 
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding circumstances indicate 
the stop is a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional." Id. at 979. 
In other words, the officer can only make the stop upon reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a 
crime, or for a traffic violation that would normally justify a 
stop, based on the "reasonable officer" standards. After-acquired 
probable cause cannot retroactively justify an illegal stop. State 
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah App. 1988). 
In State v. Baird, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (Utah App. 
1988) the Court recognized that 
there are tree levels of police-citizen encounters 
requiring different degrees of justification to be 
constitutionally permissible. The Utah Supreme Court has 
listed these as follows: (1) [A]n officer may approach a 
citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an 
officer may seize a person if the officer has an 
"articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop," (3) an officer may 
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to 
believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed.State v. Baird. 94 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 quoting 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th 
Cir. 1984)). 
A traffic stop is a level two situation as it involves 
detention and therefore requires a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion. Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). The 
traffic stop must be te*nporary and is to last no longer than is 
necessary to issue a citation or a warning. It is also to be 
remembered that the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the 
person, even those that only involve a brief detention short of a 
traditional arrest. Anytime a police officer stops a person and 
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restrains him so that he is not free to walk away, that person has 
been "seized" and his seizure nust be reasonable. United States v. 
Bricmoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
In State v. Arrovo, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Utah App. 
1989) the officer stopped a vehicle for following three to eight 
car lengths behind the vehicle in front of it and cited the driver 
- who the officer had noted was Hispanic just before he made the 
stop - for following too closely. The officer asked if he could 
search his vehicle, defendant agreed whereupon 2.2 pounds of 
cocaine was found inside the passenger door panel. The trial court 
held that no traffic violation had occurred and ruled that the 
traffic stop had been made as a pre-text to further investigate a 
vehicle which he found suspicious because of Hispanic occupants and 
out-of-state plates. This Court agreed that the stop was an 
unconstitutional pretext to search for drugs saying that "[w]e are 
persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped [the 
car] and cited him for 'following too closely1 except for some 
unarticulated suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 
Arroyo. 103 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. This Court, however, held that 
the evidence should not have been suppressed because of the consent 
of the driver to the search. Consent to search, as it applies to 
the facts of this case is more fully covered in Point IV, infra. 
Similarly, in the instant case the officer testified that 
he had observed that the Appellants1 vehicle was "following too 
closely" to the vehicle in front of it. The officer stated that he 
was going in the opposite direction as the Appellants1 car but was 
preparing to turn around (Trans. Suppress. Hearing, p. 4 
(hereinafter "R.")). He testified that Appellant's car was about 
one and a half car lengths behind the vehicle in front of it and 
that the vehicles were traveling approximately 60 to 65 miles per 
hour. Id. The officer later stated that the car in front of 
Appellants had slowed down and that they had been caught behind it. 
It appeared that they wanted to take the next exit (R. 51). The 
officer followed the two cars for a mile or less, which would have 
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been for a minute or less, and indicated that traffic was light 
(R. 51-52). The vehicles were in the outside or slow lane (R. 
53). The officer further indicated that the vehicle bore out of 
state plates, a fact that he noted before he turned on his light to 
stop the vehicle (R. 6)• 
The officer Testified that although "we write them 
[following too closely citations] on a regular basis", (R. 31), 
that regular basis is "one or two a month". At the same time the 
officer indicated that those numbers are even lower in the non-
summer months. As it was, the officer never did issue a moving 
citation. All that was issued was a warning citation. The 
totality of the evidence did not cause the officer to further 
investigate whether the driver was intoxicated nor was there any 
evidence that any other offense was being committed or about to be 
committed by either Appellant which would have given the officer a 
valid reason to stop the vehicle. 
From the totality of the facts presented here and the 
officer's admissions that he formed an intent to investigate the 
contents of Appellants1 car long before he had developed probable 
cause to effect an arrest and from the guidance provided by Arroyo, 
this Court should conclude the stop was a pretext to conduct a 
search based on an unarticulated hunch. This Court should therefore 
conclude that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States as well as Article I, Section 14 
of the Constitution of Utah in so far as that Section has been 
determined to be consistent or equal to its federal counterpart, 
and that any evidence seized as a result of the unconstitutional 
stop should have been excluded by the District Court. 
b. The stop violated the protections guaranteed to 
Appellants by Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah 
The wording of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution 
is essentially identical to the wording of the Fourth Amendment to 
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the United States Constitution with the only material exception 
being that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution replaces 
a semi-colon for a comma after the word "violated"• 
This similarity does not necessarily imply that the 
meaning of the Utah constitutional provision is the same as its 
federal counterpart. Article I, Section 14 was enacted almost 104 
years after its federal counterpart was ratified. The provision 
was passed by a State which was far removed from the mentality and 
life style of those living in Philadelphia and Washington. The 
State of Utah had suffered a large degree of federal involvement in 
its religious and family affairs and federal troops were stationed 
in the State to control its activities. Polygamy, a religious 
institution which was believed to be a sacred order by many in 
authority in both religious and secular governing bodies, had been 
outlawed after intense pressure was brought to bear against the 
State. Many citizens of the State continued to practice polygamy 
and had a keen interest in doing all that was possible in seeing 
that entry into their homes was restricted. It is not unrealistic 
to state that many of those persons practicing polygamy may have 
been in a position to influence the public at large as well as 
those representing them in the state legislature, or may have been 
members of the legislative body themselves. Neither is it 
unreasonable to presume therefore that because of this historical 
and probably pervasive attitude of alienation from ruling 
authority, the drafters of the State's constitutional provision 
respecting security of persons, papers, and homes intended the 
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provision to give greater protection to the State's citizens than 
that afforded to the citizens of the United States by that 
constitution. 
An analysis of the question is hindered considerably by 
the dearth of cases in support of such position or any indication 
of legislative intent associated with the adoption of Article I, 
Section 14, in stark contrast to the recorded debates over the 
ratification of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. The following appears to be the entire record of 
the proceedings as to Article I, Section 14: 
The Chairman: Gentlemen, we will take up Section 
14. 
Section 14 was read and passed without amendment. 
Official Reports and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Salt 
Lake City on the 4th Day of March, 1895 to Adopt a Constitution for 
the State of Utah, 319 (1898). 
It is nevertheless submitted that this Court can, in an 
appropriate situation, give a more liberal, independent, and 
protective interpretation to the Utah Constitution than that given 
to the Fourth Amendment. The Court could adopt the view of the 
Idaho Supreme Court which unanimously stated 
[The] federal and state constitutions derive their power 
from independent sources. [Thus,] state courts are at 
liberty to find within the provisions of their own 
constitutions greater protection than is afforded under 
the federal constitution as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court, [citations] This is true even when 
the constitutional provisions implicated contain similar 
phraseology. Long gone are the days 
when state courts will blindly apply United States 
Supreme Court interpretation and methodology when in the 
process of interpreting their own constitutions.State v. 
Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n. 6, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n. 6 
(1985) (emphasis added) quoted in State v. Johnson, 110 
Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288, 1292 n. 1 (1986). 
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Similar sentiments were stated by the Mississippi Supreme 
Court when it stated that 
We accord to the U.S. Supreme Court the utmost respect in 
its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. We must, 
however, reserve for this Court the sole and absolute 
right to make the final interpretation of our state 
Constitution and, while of great persuasion, we will not 
concede that simply because the U.S. Supreme Court may 
interpret a U.S. Constitutional provision that we must 
give the same interpretation to essentially the same 
words in a provision of our state Constitution.Penick v. 
State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983). 
Other states have also taken the lead in construing their 
state constitutional provisions as providing additional protection 
to those already granted by the Fourth Amendment. In State v. 
Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985) the Alaska Supreme Court 
found that it should "construe Alaska's constitutional provisions 
such as Article I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to 
those granted by the United States Supreme Court under the federal 
constitution." The Washington Supreme Court made a similar 
decision. State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984). 
Furthermore, Utah case law explicitly suggests the 
possibility of a different construction for Article I, Section 14 
than is given the Fourth Amendment. In the case of State v. Watts, 
Chief Justice Hall stated that though [we have declined] 
to depart in this case from our consistent refusal 
heretofore to interpret article I, section 14 of our 
constitution in a manner different from the fourth 
amendment to the federal constitution, we have by no 
means ruled out the possibility of doing so in some 
future case. Indeed, choosing to give the Utah 
Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove 
to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's 
citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the 
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federal courts.State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n. 8 
(Utah 1988). 
Other cases in which the need to brief state 
constitutional issues have been urged, with an obvious eye toward 
potentially expanding the coverage of the state provisions, include 
State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 1987) Zimmerman, J., 
concurring); State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) (in 
which Justice Durham specifically stated that the Court approved 
the formula of scholastic commentary and analytic technique for 
analyzing state constitutional issues set forth by the Supreme 
Court of Vermont in State v. Jewett. 500 A.2d 233, 236-38 (Vt. 
1985) ; and State v. Hvgh. 711 P. 2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
As part of briefing this Court on state constitutional 
issues which may be applicable to a certain case, this Court 
requires that the matter be touched on at the trial level. See 
State v. Johnson. 104 Utah Adv. Reports 34, 35 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The problem with such a requirement is that counsel is 
effectively precluded from making an argument, because there is no 
case law to support his argument. This results in a sort of 
cognitive dissonance on the part of the practitioner who feels the 
need to state that the state constitution may provide greater 
protection then the federal constitution, even though they are 
essentially identical, but cannot make an argument which can carry 
any weight at the trial level because of the lack of cases and 
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precedent for the argued position. Therefore, in light of the 
present situation the practitioner simply does not bring up the 
point. If it is brought up, as it was in the present case, there 
is no incentive, or point, in making more then just the barest 
allegation that the state constitution provides greater protection 
in the area. 
In this case, for the reasons touched on above, counsel 
for the Appellants did not argue specifically at the trial level 
that the Utah Constitution gives any greater protection to the 
right of a Utah citizen to be free of unreasonable searches and 
seizures. However, in the Motion to Suppress filed by Defendant 
Lovegren, it is specifically mentioned that the motion is based, 
inter alia "on the Constitution of Utah" (See Exhibit B). A 
similar statement is seen in the Motion to Suppress filed by 
Defendant Southern (See Exhibit C). 
Also, it is clear that the State and the officer involved 
perceive that the officer was acting pursuant to Section 77-7-15, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). Any time that a police officer acts 
pursuant to this statute, Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution is implicitly raised and is applicable to any 
discussion based on search and seizure issues, and whether the 
arguments submitted by counsel are primarily based on federal case 
law is immaterial. 
If this Court were to take a position on the relative and 
independent protections founded in Article I, Section 14, it is 
felt that the conflicting federal interpretations of the Fourth 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution would be unraveled and 
police officers and practitioners and the general citizenry of the 
state would be able to rely on a bright line - if not a "brighter 
line" - approach to many of the issues raised in this area, issues 
which are aggravated by continuing federal decisions. Such a 
bright line approach would be proper in light of the history of the 
state at the time that Article I, Section 14 was enacted and would 
be welcome to all those persons called upon to act under and to 
interpret Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States on a 
daily basis. 
Such a bright line approach will also serve to curtail 
abuses by police and other governmental officers who may now find 
it convenient to violate the law because of conflicting and 
cumbersome federal decisions, which often serve to generate more 
problems and issues then they remedy. 
Based on the foregoing it is clear that this Court would 
not be remiss in holding that the actions of the officer in making 
a pretextual stop so that he might investigate and satisfy his 
unarticulated hunches were unconstitutional under the provisions of 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, even if this Court 
is not satisfied the federal constitutions or prior state case law 
interpreting the state provisions as equal to the federal 
provisions did not demand such a determination. Further, this 
Court need not wait for the state Supreme Court to make a decision 
on this issue as that Court is in no better position to make the 
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decision than is this Court because of the lack of case authority 
and legislative history and because that Court is less likely to 
review this issue because of the statutory restrictions on its 
jurisdiction to review the type of criminal cases where this issue 
is most likely to be raised. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING THE INITIAL STOP OF APPELLANTS1 CAR WAS PROPER, 
THE SUBSEQUENT AND EXTENDED DETENTION OF APPELLANTS 
RESULTED IN A DE FACTO ARREST WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE 
It has been held that whenever a police officer detains a 
person, and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that 
person. As there has been a seizure the Fourth Amendment applies 
in determining whether the seizure of the person has been 
unreasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968). See State 
v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 122 (Utah 1976). 
A police officer may not act on a hunch, speculation, or 
mere suspicion. Terry. 392 U.S at 27. The officer may act on 
specific, reasonable inferences based on the facts, which he is 
permitted to analyze in light of his experience. Id. This 
"reasonable suspicion", which does not rise to the level of 
"probable cause", has been described as a combination of specific 
and articulable facts together with reasonable inferences from 
those facts, which, in light of the officer's experience, 
reasonably justify a belief that the person to be detained had 
committed, or was about to commit a crime. Id. See State v. 
Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984). Additionally, "an 
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
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is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the 
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means 
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in 
a short period of time" Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983). It is clear that a police officer cannot seek to 
substantiate his hunches or suspicions of wrongdoing by resorting 
to tactics which approach the conditions of an arrest. See Dunawav 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Also, the burden of proof is on 
the State to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on 
the basis of reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope 
and duration to satisfy the limits of an investigative seizure. 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. 
As has been shown, it is recognized that police officers 
can detain persons in certain situations under less than probable 
cause. The United States Supreme Court case of United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) is clear in saying that 
it is permissible to stop an individual upon reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity for the purpose of questioning limited to the 
purpose of the stop. The seizure in Brignoni-Ponce was to verify 
or dispel the suspicion that the immigration laws were being 
violated. It should be noted that the Court made it clear that the 
stop could only be for the purpose of questioning the driver and 
his passengers about their citizenship status and to explain 
suspicious circumstances. The Court went on to say that "any 
further detention or search must be based on consent or probable 
cause." Brianoni-Ponce, 462 U.S. at 881-882. Similarly, in 
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Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) the Supreme Court upheld 
the temporary detention of a man on less than probable cause while 
a search warrant was being executed. The Court in that case held 
the intrusion was justified by substantial law enforcement 
interests such that the seizure of the man could be made on 
articulable suspicion not amounting to probable cause. Michigan v. 
Summers. 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981). 
As mentioned above, the test for determining whether the 
detention of a person falls within the guidelines of the Fourth 
Amendment exception recognized by Terry is whether there are 
specific and articulable facts present which serve to give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion that the person stopped, is, or is about to 
be, engaged in criminal activity. 
However, when the length of the stop and the degree of 
intrusiveness becomes excessive there has been a de facto arrest 
without probable cause and the Constitution has been violated. In 
making the determination of a de facto arrest the U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated that 
[i]n assessing whether a detention is too long in 
duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we 
consider it appropriate to examine whether the police 
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, 
during which time it was necessary to detain the 
defendant. [citations] A court making this assessment 
should take care to consider whether the police are 
acting in a swiftly developing situation. . . .United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). 
See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (Terry and the cases that 
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followed it, permit only brief investigative stops and extremely 
limited searches based on reasonable suspicion and do not provide 
the police with a commission to employ whatever investigative 
techniques they deem appropriate). 
It is clear that the length of the detention is not the 
only factor in determining whether a de facto arrest has occurred. 
In Royer the lower court found that the fact that the police had 
placed their suspect in a small enclosed area and confronted him 
with two officers, told him that they were narcotics officers and 
suspected him of transporting narcotics, retrieved his luggage and 
took it into their possession, and never told him that he was free 
to leave was, as a practical matter, the equivalent of an arrest. 
The Supreme Court agreed holding that the show of official 
authority would surely give a reasonable person the idea that he 
was not free to leave and that he was being detained by the police. 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 502-03. 
Though, in the instant case, there is no indication 
within the record as to the exact amount of time spent by the 
officer in detaining the Defendants before their arrest the officer 
did testify that he first observed the Defendants at "around 10:00 
O'clock in the morning" (R.4). "Around" is not defined in the 
officer's testimony. He followed the Defendants for about one 
minute and turned on his light after that time had passed (R. 5-6). 
The police report for some unknown reason does not indicate the 
time of arrest. The very next time that is listed on any sort of 
official document is 12:26 PM, when the Passenger submitted to a 
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urine sample at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center in Provo, 
Utah. The police report is also devoid of any indications as to 
where the Defendants were transported after their arrests, the 
results of any interrogations by the police, etc., and how long 
these might have taken. 
However, it is possible to show that there was a de facto 
arrest of the Defendants based on the actions of the officer. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the officer did not make a 
pretextual traffic stop, as discussed in Point I, supra., then the 
main reason for the stop, the investigation of a possible traffic 
violation, ceased to exist as soon as the officer issued his 
warning citation and reasonably satisfied himself that the driver 
had a valid drivers license and that other routine traffic matters 
were in order. When the officer approached the Passenger and asked 
him for his drivers license, the officer was detaining the 
Passenger as well as the Driver who didn't feel free to leave the 
scene without his friend, on a hunch and on the mere speculation 
that because the inside of their car was cluttered, because they 
were from out-of-state, because they carried a road map, and 
because they wore sunglasses, they were drug smugglers. This 
detention progressed to a search of the interior of the vehicle, to 
a search of the Passenger (but not the Driver) for "weapons", to 
the removal of the keys from the Passenger's pocket despite here 
not being a weapon or contraband, and ultimately to the search of 
the trunk of the car, the contents of the trunk, and the interior 
of the contents of the trunk, all at the officer's urging. 
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All of this progressively intrusive activity by the 
officer took place after the purported purpose of the stop had been 
addressed and satisfactorily resolved by issuance of a warning 
citation but before the officer determined that he had probable 
cause to make an arrest. While on the scene the officer claimed 
that he was looking for evidence of alcohol influence (R. 13), he 
appeared relatively uninterested in checking for the odor of an 
alcoholic beverage or in having the Driver perform any field 
sobriety tests (R. 54-56). At the suppression hearing the officer 
admitted he was sure that they weren't under the influence of 
alcohol (R. 56) and that he was looking for evidence to support his 
"suspicions" of drug use and drug smuggling. (See R. 28-29, 35, 
50) . 
Essentially, this officer attempted to create a category 
"2(a)" level of police-citizen encounter - somewhere between the 
brief, limited, investigatory stop allowed by Section 77-7-15 and a 
full-blown arrest based on probable cause. This Court should take 
care not to ratify such a new category or to allow a perversion of 
established Fourth Amendment principal, whether the offending 
officer blatantly violates the protections or, as here, attempts to 
obscure his violations by feigning repeated requests for consent. 
After issuance of the warning citation, Appellants were 
effectively made the subject of a de facto arrest because they were 
detained beyond the time and scope necessary to the purposes of the 
initial stop; their continued detention was not based on an 
articulated reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing much less on 
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probable cause. This Court should rule such arrest invalid as not 
founded on probable cause and the search incident thereto likewise 
illegal. 
POINT III 
THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF THE PASSENGER WAS CONDUCTED 
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT REASONABLE SUSPICION PARTICULAR TO THE 
PASSENGER; EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE PAT-DOWN WAS 
NOT SUBJECT TO SEIZURE 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Section 77-7-16 
allow a police officer to pat down the outer clothing of a person 
without putting his hands within the pockets or under the outer 
surface of their garments until an object which is, or which could 
be a weapon, is found. The officer may then reach into the pockets 
or under the clothing to remove the weapon or to determine in fact 
whether it is a weapon. The sole justification for the search is 
the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and is to 
be "confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to 
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the 
assault of the police officer." Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. The 
officer making the search must be able to articulate a reasonable 
belief and point to specific and articulable facts that the person 
was armed and presently dangerous and which would warrant the 
intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 
146 (1972). The facts of each case must be judged against an 
objective standard: 
[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment 
of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief1 that the action taken was 
appropriate? [citations] Anything less would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based 
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on nothing more substantial than inarticulable hunches, a 
result this Court has consistently refused to sanction, 
[citations] And simple, 'good faith on the part of the 
arresting officer is not enough.'Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
at 22 quoting Beck v. Ohio. 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964). 
This objective standard was adopted by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Baumaaertel, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1988). 
Section 77-7-16 reads in full, "A peace officer who has stopped a 
person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a 
dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other person 
is in danger." It was held in the case of State v. Roybal, 716 
P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) that the section must be interpreted to meet 
the constitutional requirements of Terry. 
Terry makes it clear that a police officer is not 
entitled to act on a vague or unarticulated hunch, mere 
speculation, or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion; but only 
on the specific reasonable inferences the officer is entitled to 
drawn from the facts in light of his experience. Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 27. The Court concluded in its opinion 
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes 
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in 
light of his experience that criminal activity might be 
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be 
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of 
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a 
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to 
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, 
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others 
in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the 
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
weapons which might be used to assault him. Terry, 392 
U.S at 30. 
The narrow scope of Terry does not permit a frisk for 
weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the 
person to be frisked. Therefore, any search outside of Terry is 
either unconstitutional or must be supported by the stricter 
standard of probable cause. 
In the instant case the officer testified that the driver 
of the vehicle was "nervous", which made him (the officer) nervous. 
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Nervousness by itself, in any case, is not sufficient to 
give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person is committing or 
about to commit a crime. Nor does a statement of mere nervousness 
on the part of a police officer rise to the level of specific and 
articulable facts which, when taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion 
against the Defendant. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 
It has been held in numerous cases that evidence of 
nervous behavior or so-called "furtive gestures" or movements, such 
as moving around, looking around, "slouching down", "hunching 
down", etc., without more, does not rise to the level of 
articulable suspicion of wrong-doing. See State v. Schlosser, 108 
Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah 1989) (acting "fidgety" not sufficient 
to rise to level of articulable suspicion); State v. Mendoza. 748 
P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987) (nervous behavior does not rise to level 
of reasonable suspicion); State v. Holmes, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 74, 
77 (Utah App. 1989) (furtive movements or gestures alone are 
insufficient to constitute probable cause for search or arrest and 
other factors must be shown which, in the totality of the 
circumstances, would lead a reasonable and prudent person to 
believe that there is evidence of criminal activity); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah App. 1988) (failure to make eye 
contact, as nervous conduct, when confronted by a Highway Patrol 
trooper is consistent with innocent, as well as criminal behavior); 
State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 944-45 (Utah App. 1988) (nervous 
behavior can have no weight in determining if there is reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity); People v. Superior Court of Yolo 
County, 3 Cal.3d 807, 821-24 (1970) (moving around within car not 
sufficient to give probable cause to search); United States v. 
Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86-87 (5th Cir. 1980) ("slouching" is not 
sufficient to justify stop and avoidance of eye contact can have no 
weight whatsoever); United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (same). 
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The officer indicated at the suppression hearing that 
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 [t]he more I asked [Mr. Lovegren] the more nervous he became." 
(R. 10). The officer also stated that "When I asked him about the 
trip specifically about the trip where he had been, who he had been 
with and he became extremely nervous." When asked why he concluded 
that Mr. Lovegren was nervous he stated, "His heart was beating so 
hard that it was making his shirt move." (R. 11). [This Court 
should reflect on this rather remarkable statement by the officer 
when it assesses the validity of the officers claim of consent to 
search that is challenged hereinbelow.] The officer further stated 
that "He was just [sic] had a nervous nature about him. He would 
not give me eye contact when answering questions. And his eyes 
would dart around as if he were searching for an answer or 
something." Id. 
It is clear from the authority given above that the 
courts give little or no weight to manifestations of so-called 
"nervous" behavior, or to furtive movements, in developing probable 
cause to search or arrest or in showing reasonable suspicion for a 
pat-down search for weapons. This authority is obviously 
applicable to the instant case. 
The officer felt that the nervous behavior of Mr. 
Lovegren was an indicia of drug trafficking. However, failure to 
make eye contact and other so-called types of nervous behavior are 
characteristics which can be attributed to the innocent party as a 
result of finding himself in the presence of a law enforcement 
officer, an unpleasant experience for most persons in any case, 
whether they are guilty of any wrong-doing or not. To say that 
nervous behavior alone is a reliable indicia of criminal behavior 
is to ignore, as the cases in this area suggest, normal human 
behavior. 
Also, observing, interpreting, and articulating the 
supposed reasons and rationale for "nervous behavior" calls for a 
totally subjective analysis on the part of the person making the 
observations. Such subjective observations and interpretation, 
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without more, are an inherently inaccurate indicator of human guilt 
or wrongdoing and enjoy no reliability at r.ll. 
In addition to indications of nervousness, the officer 
indicated he noticed that the interior of the vehicle was 
cluttered. He noticed pop and beer cans on the floor and seeing a 
red cooler in the back seat. He saw several cigarette packages and 
cigarette ashes in the vehicle (See R. 9) as well as a road map. 
Based on these observations the officer concluded that the 
Appellants were living out of their car and smuggling drugs. (R. 
36-38). 
It should likewise be clear that the officer is not 
entitled to give any weight to the fact that the car in which the 
Appellants were riding was cluttered. Cigarette ashes and butts, 
empty pop and beer cans, and a cooler in the back seat are just as 
indicative of the short one day trip as it may be indicative of the 
longer trip. Even had there been evidence or testimony that the 
Appellants were living out of the car such evidence or testimony 
cannot be accorded any weight as evidence of criminal wrong-doing. 
Many law-abiding and innocent persons are guilty of having a 
cluttered or messy automobile. 
The officer also made note of the fact that "[b]oth 
suspects at the time were, it was in the summer they both had dark 
glasses on. I could not observe their eyes. They were that dark. 
One had mirrored sunglasses on. It made them a little suspicious 
as to what was going on." (R. 9). (However, he did later admit 
that "A lot of people wear sunglasses and there is nothing wrong 
with that." (R. 44)). 
The officer also testified that the driver's eyes were 
"glassy, blood shot, similar to what I had seen in other cases 
involving either drugs and/or alcohol," (R. 10) and that [the 
Passenger's] eyes were also red and blood shot just as the drivers 
were," (R. 12), Nevertheless, as has been noted he did not find it 
necessary to have the Appellants perform the standard battery of 
tests designed to confirm or ally his purported suspicions. The 
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reasonable and logical inference would be that if there was a 
question involving the fitness of the Driver to operate the 
vehicle, then he would be subjected to a field sobriety test. A 
logical and rational person would not expect the officer to ignore 
the Driver and perform a pat-down search of the Passenger. It is 
argued by Appellants that the officer's lack of real concern with 
determining the Driver's fitness to drive in spite of noted 
objective indications that might normally cause him to request 
field tests, belied his actual lack of concern with alcohol 
offenses, his preconceived intent to search the car for drugs, and 
his dogged determination that every factor he came upon supported 
that pre-formed intent to search. 
From the nervousness he noted in the Driver, the general 
condition of the car, and some indication that the Passenger may 
have been under the influence of "something", the officer decided 
that he would search the passenger. Interestingly, the search took 
place almost immediately after the officer had been told by Mr. 
Lovegren that the key to the trunk was not available (See R. 16-
18). In his pat-down search of the Passenger he felt an object 
which, the officer stated, he thought could be a weapon (R. 18). 
Without asking the Passenger what the object was, the officer went 
into the pocket and pulled out the object, which ended up being a 
set of car keys with a ring which matched the ring containing the 
vehicle ignition key. Instead of returning the keys to the 
Passenger's pocket, as he had obviously determined that it was not 
a weapon or contraband, the officer began to ask questions about 
the keys. 
Assuming (without agreeing) that the officer had a valid 
reason to go into the pocket of the Passenger, the officer was not 
constitutionally justified in removing the keys from the 
Passenger's pocket, after there identity had been determined. 
Neither was he justified in using them to further aid him in his 
quest to locate the contraband which he felt was present in the 
vehicle. The case law is clear that what can be seized from the 
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person being patted down is restricted to weapons, contraband 
reasonably seized while engaging in the pat-down and fruits of a 
crime, etc., which were reasonably discovered during the course of 
a properly applied pat-down search for weapons, and which fell 
within the scope of the search for those weapons. See United 
States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 702-04 (1983); Florida v. Rover. 460 
U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 147-49 
(1972). The keys were none of the above and should have been 
replaced in the Passengerfs pocket. 
It is obvious that from the beginning the officer 
suspected that the Appellants were in possession of some sort of 
contraband although he had no articulable reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause in support of his suspicions. He therefore 
unreasonably detained his suspects using the purported 
"nervousness" of the Driver, his own alleged nervousness, and every 
other factor he observed as a basis for a Terry search of the 
Passenger. However, as has been shown, none of these factors alone 
or together were sufficient to meet the test of a Terry search of 
the person who was acting "nervous" (the Driver) much less the 
Passenger. Nor did the officer testify to a sufficient reason why 
the keys felt like a weapon nor was there valid reason to seize the 
keys, even if there was a reasonable basis for the pat-down or for 
entry into the pocket. 
This Court should conclude that no valid reasonable 
suspicion supported a pat-down search of the Passenger, that entry 
of his pocket was not supported by articulable suspicion of the 
presence of a weapon within, that seizure of the keys was not 
justified, that the use of the keys to search the car was tainted 
by the prior illegal search and seizure of the keys, and that the 
ultimate seizure of the contraband was therefore "come at by the 
exploitation of that illegality ...." Wong Sun v United States, 371 
US 471 (1963). 
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POINT IV 
THE SEARCH OF APPELLANTS' AUTOMOBILE CANNOT BE BASED ON 
CONSENT 
The test to be applied in the search issue is whether 
under all of the circumstances, a fair minded person, giving due 
consideration to the rights and interests of the public, as well as 
to those of the suspect, would judge the search to be an 
unreasonable intrusion into the rights of the suspect. State v. 
White, 577 P.2d 552, 553-54 (Utah 1978). This test is satisfied if 
consent is given to the search. Id. at 554. M[W]here the validity 
of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving 
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and 
voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere 
submission to a claim of lawful authority." Florida v. Rover, 460 
U.S. 491, 497 and cases therein (1983); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972, 981 (Utah App. 1988). Voluntary consent is that which was in 
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, 
express or implied. State v. Arroyo. 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 35 
(Utah App. 1989); Sierra. 754 P.2d at 980; Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonter 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). "The issue of whether a 
person's consent to a search is voluntary • is a question of fact 
to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances1" 
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 980 quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 227 (1973). Should this Court determine that the initial stop 
and/or the subsequent extended detention and/or the seizure of the 
trunk keys from the Passenger's pocket was [were] improper, the 
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appropriate inquiry then is "whether, granting establishment of the 
prior illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 
has been come at by the exploitation of that illegality or instead 
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint•" State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (quoting Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). In other words, was 
the purported consent to search voluntarily given, did it extend to 
the area where the controlled substance was found, and did the 
consent "purge" or "cure" any prior illegality? Appellants think 
not for the reasons set forth below. 
Furthermore, though it has been held that the trial 
court's factual evaluation underlying its decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress ought not to be disturbed unless clearly 
erroneous, State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987), the 
only indication of the trial court's findings regarding the facts 
involved in the consent is found on pages 93 and 94 of the 
transcript of the suppression hearing. Unfortunately that brief 
recitation of the Court's thinking does not provide this Court with 
much of a basis for scrutinizing the factual evaluation underlying 
the ruling. Nevertheless, from that transcript, this Court should 
be able to recognize the following conflict concerning the issue of 
consent. 
While the officer testified that he asked verbally for a 
consent to search the interior of the car, and received an 
affirmative response from its occupants, (R. 13) the Passenger 
stated that the officer did not ask anyone for permission to look 
35 
through the car; he just told the two men to stand by the front of 
the car and started to look through it (R. 64). The Driver 
testified likewise (R. 73). 
A similar conflict of opinion exists regarding the claim 
of consent for the search of the trunk of the car (See R. 15-16). 
Again, the officer claims that he asked for and received permission 
to search the trunk, but could not at that time because the Driver 
stated that he did not have the trunk key. According to the 
officer after he finally obtained the key to the trunk from the 
Passenger, the Driver took the key and attempted to open the trunk, 
though the officer admits that he may have assisted him in getting 
the trunk open after Mr. Lovegren claimed that the key did not fit 
(R. 19, 45-46). The officer then stated that he asked for and 
obtained permission to look within the suitcases themselves (R. 
22) . 
Both Appellants maintain that the officer never asked for 
permission to search the trunk or the suitcases. Once he found the 
key in the Passenger's pocket pursuant to the pat-down search for 
weapons they claim that the officer went directly to the trunk, 
opened it, removed a suitcase from the trunk, opened it, and began 
to search through it (R. 65-67; 73-75) eventually finding the 
controlled substance. 
There is no conflict, however, concerning the fact that 
the officer did not ask for permission to search within the 
contents of the suitcase, specifically the cookie box which 
contained the controlled substance. The officer claimed that as he 
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felt had received permission to look in the trunk, he therefore 
assumed he also had permission to look within the box which was in 
the suitcase which was in the trunk (R. 48). 
a. The totality of the circumstances does not 
support a finding that either Appellant 
consented to a search of the vehicle or its 
contents 
Appellants recognize the heavy practical burden any 
Defendant must bear when it is alleged that the sworn testimony of 
a law officer is inaccurate; Appellants are also mindful of their 
burden to persuade this Court that the trial Court's findings in 
support of its ruling was "clearly erroneous". And although there 
are numerous instances where the officer and the Appellants 
disagree on the events surrounding the search, this Court should 
consider several undisputed facts as evidence that in light of 
totality of the circumstances, consent was not given and the trial 
Court erred in concluding that " I believe I am inclined to believe 
the officer in this matter." 
1) The Passenger removed the trunk keys from the 
ignition key chain at the steering column and attempted to conceal 
them from the officer (R.62-3). 
2) When found in possession of the trunk keys the 
Passenger denied that they belonged to the Driver's car or that 
they fit the trunk lock (R. 19, 43-44, 65). 
3) The Driver denied having a key to the trunk (R. 
16 46, 77). 
4) Appellants denied having any luggage (R. 14). 
37 
5) Before the officer looked into the cookie box, 
the Driver attempted to conceal the cookie box which contained the 
controlled substance by throwing clothing on top of it (R. 23) and 
later grabbed the box out of the officer's hands, claiming "you 
can't have that. That is mine." (R. 23-24). 
Even disregarding the disputed facts and focusing on 
these uncontroverted versions of the events, this Court should 
conclude that it is logically inconsistent for the trial Court to 
have concluded that consent to enter the trunk was given at the 
same time that attempts were made to conceal the key and dissuade 
the officer and cover the cookie box. Interestingly, or perhaps 
inadvertently, the State's Bill of Particulars reflects this 
inconsistency. In response to Defendant Lovegren's Motion for a 
description of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the 
various counts, the Bill states that Lovegren became "nervous and 
vague" and that before the officer "reached down and looked in the 
box," Lovegren "tried to conceal the cookie box" (Bill of 
Particulars, paragraphs 1 and 3). 
Appellants do not ask this Court to decide the truth of 
the disputed facts. Rather, it is urged that in even light of the 
undisputed facts it cannot be concluded that consent was granted 
for entry into the trunk and that the trial Court was clearly 
erroneous in ruling otherwise. 
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b. Assuming that consent was given for a search, 
taking the facts in their best light, the 
consent was coerced from the Defendants because 
of their de facto arrest 
The facts supporting the argument that Appellants were 
made subject of a de facto arrest have been discussed in Point II, 
supra. Based on the length of time that the officer detained the 
Defendants, and the degree of "pushing" by the officer to obtain 
"consent" to search the interior of the vehicle, the passenger, and 
the trunk of the car, including its contents and the interior of 
its contents, a de facto arrest occurred. It is clear that if 
consent was given to search it was coerced by the actions of the 
officer who was bent on conducting a search from early after the 
initial stop (R.28-29, 34-35). According to the passenger, 
Appellants had been detained for a considerable period of time 
before the officer allowed the Driver to come back to his car (R. 
62-63). The officer's progressive, intrusive, and time-consuming 
probings of the vehicle's interior, the Passenger, and the trunk 
and its contents then took place. If consent was given at all, it 
can be safely inferred that the Defendants hoped that the officer 
would be satisfied with just searching in his current target area, 
and then they would be free to go. 
In Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 501-04 (1983) the 
United States Supreme Court held that the actions of the officers 
involved, which consisted, among other things, of detaining the 
defendant for an unreasonable time, severely restricting his 
movements, and taking control of his luggage, served to negate the 
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consent that the defendant had earlier given to have one of his 
suitcases opened by the police. 
The facts of this case are similar in that the officer 
detained Appellants for a considerable amount of time while he 
conducted his searches. Additionally, as has been shown earlier, 
the Defendants did not feel free to go, even though there was no 
legal basis present for their detention. Should this Court 
conclude that consent to search was given, it should further 
consider whether the actions of the officer in unreasonably 
detaining Appellants while progressively expanding the area of his 
concern by searching first the interior, then the Passenger, the 
trunk of the vehicle, the suitcases, and the contents of the suit 
cases essentially simultaneous with his "requests" implied an 
apparent authority to do as he wished with or without consent and 
consequently served to negate any consent which may have been 
given. 
If the "consent" to search was given but was the product 
of the aggressive actions of the officer rather than of the 
considered agreement of the Driver, this Court should rule that 
such consent was not voluntary but was a mere submission to the 
asserted authority of the officer, Sierra, supra. 
c. If valid consent was given for the search of the 
vehicle, the consent did not extend to the 
cookie box 
There is no dispute between Appellants and the officer 
regarding the fact that no permission was sought for a search of 
the inside of the cookie box, and none was given (R. 48, 57, 67, 
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76). As was shown earlier in this section, before the officer 
looked into the box, the Driver attempted to conceal it. The 
officer removed the box from the suitcase without first asking 
permission and without giving the Driver an opportunity to respond. 
The officer then immediately twisted and distorted the box so that 
he could look inside, whereupon he saw the contraband. 
Should this Court conclude that a valid and voluntary 
consent was given for a search of the trunk area, it must then be 
determined whether that consent can be implied to logically and 
legally extend to the cookie box. Even if it is assumed for the 
sake of argument that the Driver allowed the officer access to the 
trunk and the interior of the suitcases, it is clear from the 
uncontroverted evidence that the Driver's accommodations ended at 
that point. From his attempts to conceal the box, from his 
unmistakable assertions of possessory rights to it, and from the 
testimony of all witnesses that no consent was sought or received 
for a search of the box, one could not have reasonably presumed 
that his prior consent, if any, logically extended to the box. 
Because the Driver's "consent" obviously did not logically extend 
to authority to search the cookie box, neither can the "consent" 
legally extend to the box. See Schneckloth, supra. 
Naturally, because Appellants have raised several 
questions about the existence, validity, and scope of the claimed 
consent to search, and because the record below does not 
specifically address these issues or otherwise give a clear picture 
of the evaluative processes employed in reaching the decision to 
41 
deny Appellants1 Motions to Suppress, this Court may consider an 
order of remand for the purpose of the issuance of Findings of Fact 
sufficient for this Court to review the propriety of the ruling. 
Appellants respectfully suggest an alternate approach. 
In State v. Strain, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 11-12 (Utah 1989), 
faced with a similar situation involving the validity of a 
confession in light of a claim by Defendant that the confession was 
coerced, and not having a record sufficient to review that specific 
issue, the Utah Supreme Court remanded with instructions to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of the confession. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman noted 
our remand for a determination of the question of 
voluntariness raises the possibility of an avoidable 
additional remand and appeal. . . For the benefit of the 
trial court and the parties, I think we should indicate 
that while the State has contended that 'it may be 
possible . . .to find . . . that [the party's] improper 
statements did not actually induce defendant to confess1, 
if such a finding were based on nothing more than the 
evidence presented to us at this point, there would be 
some doubt as to such a finding's sustainability.State v. 
Strain, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. at 11-12. 
Justice Zimmerman's comments are applicable to the facts of this 
case. Because in this matter such evidentiary hearing has already 
been conducted and should it be determined that the present state 
of the record is such that, owing to the undisputed evidence, a 
conclusion that the search of Appellant's vehicle cannot be 
justified for one or more of the foregoing reasons, this Court 
should consider the "possibility of an avoidable additional appeal 
and remand" by issuing its decision compelling suppression of the 
evidence. 
42 
CONCLUSION 
On the pretext of a minor traffic violation, Appellants1 
automobile was stopped by an officer determined to conduct a search 
on the strength of an unarticulated hunch that they were 
transporting drugs. After the purported reason for the initial stop 
was addressed and resolved by issuance of a warning citation, 
Appellants were unreasonably detained while the officer nosed 
around in their car eventually discovering a controlled substance. 
The officer claimed consent was given for the snowballing search. 
From the undisputed facts it is clear either that no consent was 
given, that the "consent" was coerced, or that the consent did not 
extend to the area in which the controlled substance was found. 
While Appellants urge that the search was conducted in violation of 
the guarantees set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, it is further argued that 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides 
Appellants greater protection and security in their persons and 
effects so that if the seizure is found not to have violated the 
provisions of the Fourth Amendment, it surely violated the broader 
guarantees of Article I, Section 14. This Court should therefore 
remand with instructions to suppress the seized evidence. 
Dated 2 August, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted by: 
THOMAS H. MEANS MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
Attorney for Robert D. Lovegren Attorney for Gregory W. Southern 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date below-noted 
he/she served a four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of the Appellants on the following, in the manner prescribed 
by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure No. 5(b)(1), by either depositing 
the same in the U.S. Mails, addressed as below-noted, with all 
postage and other fees pre-paid, or by delivering the same to the 
following person[s] personally, or by delivering the same to a 
person of suitable age and discretion at the address[es] below-
noted . 
Dated this day of , 1989. 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) JUDGMENT/SENTENCE STAYED 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) CASE NUMBER CR 88 284 
GREGORY WADE SOUTHERN and 
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN, ) BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Defendant. ) Reported: Richard C. Tatton, CSR 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court for 
pronouncement of judgment and sentence on the 28th day of April, 
1989. Deputy Utah County Attorney James Taylor appearing for or 
on behalf of the State of Utah. Defendant Southern appearing in 
person and represented by attorney Michael Esplin and defendant 
Lovegren appearing in person and represented by attorney Thomas 
Means. The Court, having reviewed the Presentence Investigation 
Reports and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and 
enters the following Judgment and Sentence: 
J U D G M E N T 
The defendants Gregory Wade Southern and Robert D. 
Lovegren having entered a plea of no contest on the 27th day of 
February, 1989, to the offense oi Lount I - Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree 
Felony, as charged in the Information; the defendants having been 
fully advised in detail by the Court of their constitutional 
rights and of the effects and results of the no contest plea, and 
there being no legal reason why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown 
or appearing to the Court, it is ordered and adjudged that the 
defendants be sentenced as follows: 
S E N T E N C E 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant Gregory Wade Southern is sentenced to be confined in 
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than 
one nor more than fifteen years. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant Robert D. Lovegren is sentenced to be confined in the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not less than one 
nor more than fifteen years. 
Execution of the above sentences are stayed pending an 
appeal. In the event that the appeal is not timely pursued or in 
the event the Court is affirmed, the Court will then consider 
probation as opposed to the sentences at that time. 
Dated this 28th day of April, 1989. 
THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222 
Attorney for Defendant 
81 East Center 
P.O. Box 2283 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
[801] 377-7980 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v ; 
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
| No. CR 88 296 
Defendant, by and through his attorney, Thomas H. Means, and 
pursuant to Section 77-35-12, Utah Code, the Constitution of the 
United States, and the Constitution of Utah, hereby moves that this 
Court suppress all evidence siezed from Defendant or from his 
automobile by officers of the Utah Highway Patrol for the reason 
that such siezure was without authority of warrant and was not 
otherwise permitted by law. 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 1988. 
Thomas H. Means 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the date below-noted 
he/she served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Suppress on the following, in the manner prescribed by Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure No. 5(b)(1), by either depositing the same in 
the U.S. Mails, addressed as below-noted, with all postage and 
other fees pre-paid, or by delivering the same to the following 
person[s] personally, or by delivering the same to a person of 
suitable age and discretion at the address[es] below-noted. 
Dated this ^ A day of (Ufjuu^^^. 1988. 
Steven B. Killpack 
Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center 
Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah, 84601 
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1. NELSON. 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P. 0 . Box WLW 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY WADE SOUTHERN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-88-294 
COMES NOW the defendant, Gregory Wade Southern, by and 
through his attorney of record, Michael D. Esplin, and hereby 
moves the court for an order suppressing the evidence obtained 
pursuant to the search of the person and vehicle in which 
defendant was riding. Said search was made in violation of the 
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and the Utah 
State Constitution in that the officer conducting said search did 
not have probable cause to justify said search. 
DATED this *?? day of October, 1988. 
^ ^ L 
Attorney for Defendant 
1 DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
2 I hereby cer t i fy that I delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Suppress Evidence to the Utah County Attorney, 100 East 
3 J Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84601, th is J7 day of 
October, 1988. 
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STEVEN B. KILLPACK, #1808 
Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (80J)370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DESTRTCT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAHr 
vs. 
ROBERT D. LOVEGREN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant(s) 
BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Case No. CR 88-296 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through Deputy Utah 
County Attorney, James R. Taylor, who provides the following Bill 
of Particulars: 
(1) Regarding Count I; The defendant was the driver 
of an automobile northbound on Interstate 15 in the Spanish Fork 
area on June 18, 1988, just before 10:00 o'clock in the morning. 
The vehicle was stopped and whiJe being questioned regarding 
minor traffic offenses the Defendant became extremely nervous and 
vague. While searching the trunk the,Defendant opened^a small 
blue bag containing clothing, zig-zag papers and a COOKLe box. 
The defendant threw levis on the cookie box, showed every part of 
the suitcase, but tr^ ied^  to_ggtngeal the gpokie box. The officer 
reached down and looked in the box and could see a row of cookies 
in front and a bag in the back of the box that appeared to 
contain cocaine. The defendant grabbed the box and jsjn._4^ V£QU 
_can't have that, it's mine." He then headed for the car with the 
box. The defendant tossed the box to the other occupant of the 
car who fled the scene on foot. The cookie box was located later 
in the proximity of the other defendant. The bag contained 165.5 
grams of cocaine. .Intent to distribute can be inferred from 
possession of cocaine of that quantity and value. Blood tests 
given to the defendant resulted in a presumptive positive for V 
cocaine. Additional details regarding Count I are included in 
the police report which has been supplied to counsel for the ^ 
defendant. 
(2) Regarding Count II: During the search described 
in Paragraph (1), zig-zag papers, a cigarette package with a 
straw and one-edge razor blade, a film canister with cocaine in 
it, and a plate with the appearance of cocaine residue on it were 
all locateeTwithin the car. All of these items are items 
commonly used for the ingestion or use of controlled substances. 
y^ (3) Regarding Count III: As described in Paragraph 
(1), during the search of the trunk the defendant first attempted 
to conceal the box containing__the_cocaine and then grabbed the 
bqx fxom the officer .aj^ d-Jthrew...dJL^ tg_a co-defendant who fLed the 
scene. 
(4) Regarding Count IV: When the vehicle was stopped 
as described in Paragraph (1), the defendant was operating the 
motor vehicle. A beer can, open and partly full, was located 
under the driver's seat in the front. 
(5) Evidence regarding Count V has aLready been stated 
in the preceeding paragraphs and is included in the police report 
supplied to the defendant in this matter. 
Dated this Q^ day of ju&<5tjuudieu<^~
 t 1988. 
.AMESyR. TAYLOR . 
Depj^ ty Utah Coun£y^?Vttor r 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Bill of Particulars to Thomas Means, attorney 
for defendant, 81 East Center, Provo, Utah 84601, this 
day of November, 1988. 
